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Barrow on Liberal Education and Schooling. 
 
Introduction 
 
Robin Barrow has committed himself, over the years, to an explanation and defence of a 
particular vision of liberal education which owes much to the earlier writings on 
Education of R.S. Peters. Central to this defence has been a sharp distinction between 
Education and Schooling. However, just as Peters was, in his later work, concerned to 
situate liberal education within a broader field of legitimate educational concern, so it 
should be possible to do the same with Barrow’s work on liberal education by questioning 
the impermeability of the Education/Schooling distinction, thus opening up a broader 
conception of liberal education that at the same time remains largely true to Barrow’s 
vision. 
 
A Categorial concept of education: 
 
R.S. Peters was primarily concerned to develop a categorial account of education, that is, an 
account of education as a human institution irrespective of any particular instantiation in a 
specific time or place. In his earlier writings on this subject he maintained that such an 
account would be fairly detailed (‘thick’ in the jargon), but gradually realised that any 
attempt to make it too detailed would lead to a  partial or complete assimilation of the 
categorial concept to a particular interpretation and to the filling out of that concept specific 
to a time and place rather than to a context free account. The assimilation of the concept of 
education to particular conceptions of it would, while providing detail, also vitiate the 
possibility of providing a philosophically credible universal account of a fundamental human 
institution. This must be an ever present danger for anyone attempting such an exercise, as 
every philosopher stands within a particular education tradition from which it is difficult to 
completely detach oneself, even when attempting comprehensive philosophical detachment.  
 
In his considered later view, such a categorial conception involved preparing young people 
for life, it had to involve learning and/or some form of upbringing or development and the 
preparation had to be for something regarded as worthwhile (Peters 1982).  I agree with 
Peters’ late account of the categorial concept except for one crucial point that he leaves out, 
although arguably it is implicit in what he says about the contestability of educational 
concepts. The omission is that the preparation has to be regarded as worthwhile for someone 
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by someone. When the someone in question is not the same, then the possibility can arise that 
what is regarded as worthwhile by Someone A for themselves is not regarded as worthwhile 
by Someone A for Someone B.  It may thus be the case that  A thinks that B (and his like) 
should have an education which is substantially different than the one offered to A (and his 
like). As a corollary, a B-type education would not be worthwhile for an A-type person. This 
is one important way in which one could have a bad (inappropriate) education. Such views 
about different educational experiences for different types of people might arise for a number 
of reasons: 
 
1] B is a slave and A is a member of the ruling slave-owning group. 
2] As above, but B is a helot or member of the working or peasant class and A is a landowner 
or capitalist. 
3] B has been found, by some accepted procedure, to be incapable of benefiting from certain 
kinds of education that requires a particular kind and degree of ‘intelligence’. A, on the other 
hand, can benefit from these kinds of education. 
4] B belongs to an inferior racial or sexual grouping to A and so to give him and his like an 
A-type education would be disruptive to the good ordering of society. 
5] B has different interests, abilities and talents to A and would personally benefit from an 
education different in kind to that of A. 
 
Finally, there is also the not insignificant case whereby the members of A’s group cannot 
themselves agree either on what is a worthwhile life for A-type people or what is a 
worthwhile preparation for a life for A-type people, or maybe they disagree about both. 
 
The list of possibilities is not exhaustive. An important point worth noting is that both the 
believers in one or more of 1] – 5] and those who believe that 1] – 5] provide no grounds for 
providing a distinct type of education for  A and B, may believe that their views are 
universal, applying to all kinds of human situation, rather than just the particular society in 
which the debate about kinds of education is taking place. But the fact that A regards his 
views as universally true does not mean that those views are universally true. In fact, anyone 
attempting to set out even a moderately detailed categorial account of education needs to take 
particular care to ensure that they do not claim universality for features of education present 
in their own societies that they find especially attractive, without ensuring that they are 
indeed universal features. 
 3 
 
It is not at all difficult to see how a categorial concept of education may be instantiated in 
different (often mutually incompatible) conceptions. A conception of education is a particular 
interpretation of the categorial concept. Contestation about different conceptions  arises 
primarily because different groups have different interpretations about what is worthwhile for 
themselves and secondarily because some groups may consider a certain form of education 
suitable for another group and that group might disagree with that view. 
 
Values, Aims and Education. 
 
In order to get clearer about this, we need to look more closely at the idea of preparation for a 
worthwhile life. Most obviously, perhaps, a worthwhile life (for a society, for a group or for 
an individual) is underpinned by values. Values are the fundamental ethical commitments of 
individuals, societies and groups. They are, for example, beliefs about  rights, equality and 
justice, together with religious beliefs on which the former often depend. Linked to values are 
empirical, quasi-empirical and metaphysical beliefs about the way the world is ordered, about 
human ability and its distribution, and about the way in which society should be ordered 
(Haldane, 1989). It seems indubitably to be the case that people do not all espouse the same 
values concerning justice, equality and so on, let alone about these broader religious, 
empirical and metaphysical issues which underpin the way in which education is undertaken. 
 
That being the case, and if education is both an expression of values held and an attempt to 
perpetuate those values, together with the other beliefs that support and are supported by 
those values, it is inevitable that different conceptions of education will arise. Very often 
these different conceptions will take the form of emphasis or weighting of different aspects of 
education:  liberal, vocational or civic. They need not, however, be mutually exclusive. 
 
But they may also take the form of recommendations of rigid separation of different kinds of 
education for different kinds of people, as in Plato’s Republic, for example.  
 
“Therefore inasmuch as you are all related to one another, although all your 
children will generally resemble their parents, yet sometimes a golden 
parent will produce a silver child, and a silver parent a golden child, and so 
on, each producing any.”  (Plato 1950, p.114). 
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It does not follow either that an individual child will respond to the type of education that is 
appropriate for him or her. Careful selection and rigorous monitoring in different streams of 
education will be necessary to ensure that the right type of child receives the right type of 
education for their preferred station in life (preferred that is, by the Guardians of the polis). 
 
In some cases the values are underpinned by a speculative moral psychology that dictates a  
clear curricular and pedagogic route to the desired end of a worthwhile life. The moral 
psychology that lies behind Rousseau’s Emile (1762) is a good case in point. The goal of a 
society governed as a direct democracy by individuals who regard themselves as free,  equal 
and undominated by anyone else, is thought to be only obtainable by educating people in 
such a way that they are never exposed to explicit normative pressure (Dent 1988; Winch 
1996). One may  well hold to Rousseau’s political values but not subscribe to his moral 
psychology and hence to his curricular and pedagogic prescriptions, on the grounds that the 
latter are not empirically sustainable but are nothing more than speculations. Later followers 
of Rousseau, most notably perhaps, Piaget and his followers, have sought to provide some 
empirical justification for his views, albeit working within a metaphysics of human 
development that Rousseau first set out. Indeed, one of  the main criticisms of Piagetian 
developmentalism is that it attempts to universalize data gathered in very specific 
circumstances (Vygotsky 1962; Donaldson 1978). Incidentally Rousseau’s speculative moral 
psychology led him to the view (in contrast to Plato’s in the Republic) that women should 
have radically different educations to those enjoyed by men, a view which he held to be 
universally valid, but one which would, in our society, be taken to be universally invalid. 
 
What is the logical relationship between values on the one hand and associated beliefs about 
types of people and their educability on the other?  One interesting consequence of 
recognizing a categorial concept of education is that it implies that education is an intentional 
activity, even if not always an explicitly intentional activity. A preparation for life involves 
having an end in mind  (a worthwhile life) and a viable strategy for preparing to achieve it (an 
educational process).  To institute the latter, the former must be rendered in some form which 
makes a viable strategy possible. This need not be explicit, it may be conceived of as an 
implicit goal shared by all who are concerned with the enterprise of education, without ever 
having to be articulated or debated. At the other extreme it may be very explicit and emerge 
after wide-ranging debate.  Values embodied in goals which are susceptible of strategic 
 5 
implementation are the aims of education, whether they be explicit or implicit, lacking in 
generality or detailed.  
 
Furthermore, it is evident that, if aims express values and if those values are subject to intra- 
or inter- societal variation then they themselves will vary. The very possibility of such 
variation leads to the contestability of educational aims and the fact that they are frequently 
subject to debate and disagreement leads to the fact of their actually being contested. One 
might argue that there is  no serious dispute about values, that we all share the same basic 
ideals about justice, rights, human worth and  dignity etc. and that therefore there is no 
serious dispute about educational aims (cf. Carr 2010).1 However, such a move only gains 
purchase by a covert shift from consideration of education as a universal phenomenon to a 
consideration of its instantiation in the here and now. Considered from a universal 
perspective it is evident that there has been and continues to be enormous variation in the 
values that societies hold concerning such issues as the nature of justice, of rights and what 
constitutes a worthwhile life and for whom. One might reply that something like the reaction 
of the Good Samaritan to the injured traveler exhibits a universal reaction to human distress 
and thus an exemplification of a universal human code (Pinzauti 2012). Even if this 
philosophically controversial thesis were admitted, it would not alter the fact that societies 
have always and continue to organize themselves in ways which exhibit massive diversity in 
value orientation. The fact that there is often some convergence due to the successful political 
activity of disadvantaged groups that have succeeded in getting some of their own values 
implemented does not count against this point (cf Vico 1968 for an account of class struggle 
in antiquity that leads to this kind of outcome).  
 
Even when morality is based on a universalist approach, such as within the natural law 
tradition followed by Hobbes, or through its development via the categorical imperative of 
Kant, it is far from clear that there is going to be convergence on what such a high level 
principle actually means in terms of moral conduct and legislation, and hence for education. 
For example, Hobbes thought that the derivatives of the moral law should be taught be rote to 
ensure right conduct and he also thought that proselytisation was against the Law of God. The 
implications of this position for religious education are pretty obvious. Notoriously as well, 
                                                 
1 There is some evidence that Carr has changed his views on this issue and that they are now closer to, if by no 
means identical with, the one’s espoused in this article. 
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Kant’s attempts to derive maxims from the categorical imperative have met with considerable 
scepticism (see Ward 1974, for example).  
 
The final point worth making about the reality of contestability concerns class conflict. 
Although we usually associate the idea that class conflict is the motor of history with Marx, 
the idea was already well developed in the work of Giambattista Vico in the early Eighteenth 
Century (Vico 1968), who traces the effects on our culture of class conflict from the dawn of 
civilization. Class stratification has obvious and conflicting effects on our views as to what 
kind of education is good for whom and from whose point of view. Successful class conflict 
by the subordinate classes can change the ways in which education is implemented. Even 
those who advocate for educational provision in favour of  the subordinate classes may have 
different views as to what benefits them most. Thus it is arguable that part of the popularity 
of Italian fascism amongst the working class in the early 1920s may have rested on their 
advocacy of technical education (Murphy 2002, pp.69-70), while their left-wing opponents 
were adamant in their demand for a classical education for the proletariat and in their view 
that vocational education for the masses was a  means of keeping them in a subordinate 
position (Gramsci 1975). 
 
Aims and the Curriculum. 
 
However, contestability goes beyond this. The categorial concept of education allows the 
derivation of categorial subconcepts. We have already noted the logical dependency of 
educational aims on values (among other kinds of beliefs), but we can go further. Any 
rational attempt to put a set of educational aims into effect will require a more detailed 
instantiation in terms of content (Barrow, (1976) helpfully defines the curriculum as 
prescribed content) and hence as a cumulative programme of knowledge, know-how, 
character formation and understanding that is to be developed in order to realize educational 
aims.  What though, given the logical subordination of the curriculum to aims, should be the 
place of accumulated systematic knowledge (disciplines), grouped for pedagogical purposes, 
otherwise known as subjects into which the curriculum has, in the centuries of formal 
schooling, been organized. One view is that the subjects provide an indispensable resource 
for any curriculum and must be, in some form and in some degree, incorporated into it. 
Another view, to be found in the work of John White, is that an aims-led curriculum means 
that there can be no preconception in favour of subjects, and that their adoption must be 
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contingent on whether or not they best satisfy the educational aims that a society or group has 
decided upon (cf. White 2007). There seem to be at least two important issues in play in this 
dispute. The first is a practical one concerning the usefulness of the subjects as curricular 
resources and whether it is worthwhile or even practicable to reorganize knowledge to suit 
specific aims. The second is a philosophical issue and concerns whether or not acceptance of 
the general principle of the priority of aims entails that the position of subjects is entirely 
subordinate to aims-fulfillment. This cannot be assumed, I would argue, without a view as to 
whether it is wise to dispense with the resources offered by the accumulated wisdom 
represented by the subjects. So on this view, an aims-led curriculum does not directly entail 
the subordination of subjects, but the subjects themselves represent a side-constraint on 
curriculum design.  
 
There is however, a third issue of contestation worth mentioning. When advocates of an 
aims-led curriculum do, as White often does, make specific curricular recommendations that 
imply a subordinate or truncated role for certain subjects, then one is entitled to ask whether 
or not the general logical point about the relationship between aims and curriculum has been 
subtly transformed into an argument from the adoption of aims in general to the adoption of 
certain specific aims (such as autonomy) in certain presumed social conditions (e.g. for 
White, the impending omnipresence of a leisured society in the developed world– see White, 
1997) and hence to highly specific curricular decisions concerning the role of the subjects. 
While there is nothing philosophically suspect about presenting an argument from 
philosophical premises concerning particular aims to philosophical conclusions about 
prescribed content, there is something philosophically suspect about confusing a categorial 
point about the logical structure of the conceptual field of education with specific advocacy 
of a contestable view about particular aims and their relationship with the subjects. 
 
Pedagogy. 
 
A different kind of confusion occurs in relation to pedagogy. Carr, for example, 
acknowledges that there is wide-ranging and profound disagreement on ethically valid 
pedagogies (eg op.cit. 2010 p. 101)  but denies that their existence amounts to contestability 
in the sense described above. Observing, quite rightly, that on many occasions such conflicts 
about rival pedagogies are resolved in terms of a practical solution which commands at least 
the conditional assent of all parties, he concludes, wrongly, that this fact invalidates the 
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contestability thesis (ibid. p.102). Even allowing for the case (favourable to his point of view) 
that such conflicts are nearly always resolvable, the fact that they are does not necessarily 
involve convergence on value orientation (although, in some cases it may) but rather a 
compromise on the extent to which the implementation of conflicting value stances may be 
resolvable in a pedagogically and ethically viable modus vivendi. It is unlikely, for example, 
that a Rousseauvian who holds that any overt imposition of an adult will on a child is 
corrupting, can be brought to acknowledge any alignment of  values on pedagogical matters 
with a traditionalist who believes that pedagogy necessitates the overt introduction of a child 
into a normative order in which an authoritative teacher is the prime pedagogical mover. A 
modus vivendi concerning the implementation of values is not a convergence on the values 
themselves, but a convergence on the extent to which and manner in which practices can be 
constructed which represent partial implementations of those conflicting values in ways 
acceptable to the parties that find themselves in disagreement. Indeed, we cannot expect that 
any significant compromise can be obtained on values that constitute important elements of a 
person’s stance towards the world and even of their personal identity in a broad sense of that 
term. 
 
Liberal Education in a Broad Sense and its Relationship to Vocational Education. 
 
How do these considerations bear on the question of whether liberal education occupies a 
privileged place in the educational pantheon, or indeed, whether it is (categorially speaking) 
the only practice that is worthy of the appellation ‘education’? A positive answer to this 
question, held by Barrow, Carr and the earlier and middle Peters, still commands 
considerable although by no means universal consent. A common approach by those who 
take this view is to separate some worthwhile experiences of preparation for life which do not 
satisfy liberal aims from those that do and call the former ‘schooling’ rather than 
‘educational’ practices (eg. Barrow 1981).  It is, however, implicit in what has been said 
before that such practices that involve learning, instruction, etc.  as a preparation for a 
worthwhile aspect of life, fall squarely within the categorial educational concept, rather than 
under any contingent contestable conception (cf. Gingell 2010). That being so it can be asked 
first, in what sense are non-liberal forms of education actually educational and secondly, to 
what extent are liberal forms of education compatible with other forms, such as vocational 
education? 
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Here it is possible to give a quite detailed and positive answer. Many countries which do 
attempt to articulate aims for their public education systems try to do so in a way that takes 
account of at least some of the main dimensions of a worthwhile life in the kinds of societies 
that we live in. Broadly speaking, countries like France and Germany (but not the UK) 
distinguish between preparation that develops a person as a unique individual, that develops a 
person as an economically productive member of society and that develops a person as  a 
citizen. These are not, of course, an exhaustive account of the dimensions of  a worthwhile 
human life. Many would, for example, emphasise the domestic and the religious spheres of 
life and lament the fact that they do not receive sufficient attention in modern public 
education systems. But given that these three dimensions are recognized in the aims of such 
systems, the question (with both conceptual and practical dimensions) arises as to what extent 
can they be jointly pursued, and in such a way that they are educational.  
 
My strategy for exploring this question will be to take a broad liberal conception of education 
as a point of reference and to ask to what extent the programme of such a conception has 
strong analogues in the other conceptions, particularly in that of vocational education. I hope, 
in this way, to dispel the idea that one has to change the terms of the debate in order to gain a 
foothold of understanding for vocational conceptions of education. In fact, what one 
encounters in developed forms of liberal education has very clear analogues in developed 
forms of vocational education and this allows us to appreciate their close similarities. These 
similarities arise because the values and aims that underpin both vocational and liberal 
education in modern   European societies are not that dissimilar, and therefore  compromises 
concerning values in the implementation of either are not too drastic. This is possible 
because, although such societies do have a quite clear class stratification, they do not have the 
near impermeable kind of  class structure that is to be found in more traditional societies, nor 
indeed the more informal but nevertheless deep-seated and quasi-antagonistic kind of class 
relationships to be found in England. 
 
There are two aspects to traditional liberal education which should be distinguished, even 
when they are closely related to each other. The first, perhaps most emphasized by writers 
like Peters, Hirst and, indeed, Barrow, is that of inculcation into the high culture of the 
civilization which the young person being educated has inherited. And, as Gingell and 
Brandon (2001) pointed out, this does not necessarily  have elitist implications, nor does it 
imply that all and only  what has traditionally been thought to belong to high culture should 
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belong to it. The key point is whether or not the selection that comprises the curriculum is 
‘the best that has been thought and said’. Liberal academic education in itself does not 
presuppose the kind of division between high culture and an ersatz popular culture for those 
of more feeble educational potential of the kind proposed by, for example, G.H. Bantock 
(1971), who in effect adopts view 3] above as a selection principle for different kinds of 
education for different kinds of people. 
 
 The second element is the development of character – not just in the sense of moral 
education but also as the development of an ability to exercise independent thought and 
judgment. It is also now commonplace for many writers in the tradition of liberal education to 
emphasise the development of autonomy or the ability to chart a course in life, as the primary 
educational aim for individuals. Not necessarily because the exercise of autonomy is always 
and everywhere the only valuable state of an adult human, but because, in the kinds of 
societies in which we live (and these include both liberal market and more socialist 
arrangements) we are expected to and cannot avoid exercising autonomy (Raz 1986 Ch.14). 
 
A point often overlooked but well worth dwelling on, concerns the fact that, unlike the time 
when liberal education was first developed in classical Greece and even later in the work of 
such enlightenment thinkers as Rousseau, in contemporary times the great majority of the 
population subject to mass compulsory education is destined to work for a living and this 
includes women as well as men, as the ‘living wage’ which would support a family 
practically no longer exists except for the most wealthy. Thus the autonomous person is, 
perforce, one who very likely will spend most of his or her adult life either employed or self-
employed. Few will enjoy the privileged life of a rentier. 
 
This has had consequences which philosophers of education have not devoted enough time 
and attention to. Even those enjoying a ‘classical’ liberal education will expect to have to 
work for their living. The ‘character’ side of education will unavoidably concern itself with 
virtues aligned with those of a society in which most members will be involved in paid 
employment. This alters the terms of debate for those exploring the relationship between 
liberal and vocational education and affects the kind of liberal education that is on offer.2  
                                                 
2 R.S.Peters (1981) Ch.3 ‘Democratic Values and Educational Aims’  in Essays on Educators, London, 
Routledge.  White’s (1997) Education and the End of Work can be seen as an attempt to reinstate the conception 
of education for a world without work in a contemporary setting. 
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One important way in which this socio-economic ‘elephant in the room’ has an impact on 
what we understand by liberal education is first that both the cultural and character elements 
of such an education become oriented, whether deliberately or not, to preparation for a world 
in which paid employment is a central part of the educatee’s future life. The growing role of 
higher education as the final phase in liberal education (as well as in professional education 
of various kinds) means that the subject or subjects in which  one becomes a relative expert  
at tertiary level become critical for one’s employment prospects.  
 
This happens in two ways. First through the fact that university education acts as a kind of 
filter on the labour market. The subject that one studies is regarded either as a marker of 
intellect or character. The institution and class of degree that one has obtained is also 
regarded as such a marker. In both these cases one’s certificated education acts as a positional 
filter in the labour market, whether or not one’s education has prepared one for a specific role 
in employment. The second way is connected with the fact that, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the subject that one studies at university is part of the technical knowledge that one needs to 
carry out a particular role in employment. In practice these are often difficult elements to 
disentangle from one another, but taken together they provide a powerful alignment of liberal 
education with the exigencies of employment. In many cases the connection with the labour 
market is made through further postgraduate professional education which allows the 
individual to tailor his subject expertise to the needs of particular employment roles. 
 
Liberal and Vocational Education. 
 
These considerations provide good reason to suppose that the aims of vocational and liberal 
education in our kind of society need not be as distinct as is commonly supposed. But in 
order to establish this point more securely it is important to lay to rest one particular canard 
that has been allowed to fly for far too long. This is the misidentification of vocational 
education with vocational training, a misidentification which R.S. Peters had already drawn 
attention to thirty years ago (Peters 1982, Ch.3). Training, the inculcation of the ability to 
perform confident and accurate routines associated with a task, plays a necessary role in all 
forms of education (see Wittgenstein, 1951; Ryle, 1949, for an account of the importance of 
training in learning). And although there is such a thing as vocational training, it is not to be 
identified with vocational education. Vocational training involves inculcation of the ability to 
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perform tasks connected with employment. Vocational education is concerned with preparing 
an individual to operate within a certain employment context, such as a profession or other 
kind of occupation and although it will undoubtedly involve episodes of training, will by no 
means be exhausted by them any more than liberal education is exhausted by learning times 
tables or the alphabet.  
 
It is, of course unreasonable for employers to expect that an educated person present 
themselves at their place of work ready to do a job without further preparation. But is it 
unreasonable for an employer to expect that educated people acquire some of the personal 
and social characteristics necessary to be effective employees? One concept that keeps 
getting in the way in the Anglo-American-Australian context is that of skill. Employers 
complain that university and school graduates lack the skills necessary for employability, 
while universities and schools retort (with some justice) that it is not their job to provide 
future workers with the skills necessary for employment. However, there are some personal 
characteristics and kinds of ability that it is, arguably, the responsibility of liberal educators to 
develop, at least to a certain degree, and these characteristics and abilities are necessary to 
becoming an effective and responsible employee  as well as an autonomous individual. Robin 
Barrow has himself argued (Barrow 1987) that the term ‘skill’ is manifestly inadequate as a 
label for many kinds of important and valuable kinds of practical ability and should not be 
used for them.  
 
Unfortunately, English lacks a ready-to-hand term that covers these abilities and it is 
therefore regrettable but perhaps not surprising, that ‘skill’ gets pressed into all kinds of 
inappropriate and misleading services. However, we are not bereft of conceptual resources 
for identifying and describing these kinds of abilities. We owe to Gilbert Ryle (1979, Ch.1) in 
particular the concept of an ‘adverbial verb’ or type of action which does not necessarily have 
one type of manifestation, but is manifested differently according to different contexts and 
purposes. A subset of these is particularly important to our enquiry – those that are in the 
context of German vocational education called ‘Fähigkeiten’ (as opposed to ‘Fertigkeiten’ or 
skills). They include such abilities as being able to plan, co-ordinate, control, communicate, 
co-operate, negotiate and evaluate, primarily in the context of work. It is characteristic of 
these abilities that, although they may depend on the exercise of skills for their realization, 
they are not to be identified with any particular skill or set of skills. The possession of 
‘planning skills’ such as being able to draw a diagram or describe a putative course of action 
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is not the same ability as the ability to plan, although it may, in certain circumstances, be a 
necessary component of such an ability.  To be able to plan, to co-operate or to evaluate 
requires not just the possession of certain skills, but the seriousness, attention and 
commitment that results in planning, co-operation or evaluation actually being capable taking 
place, rather than motions of, say, planning just being gone through. In other words, such 
abilities, to be truly exercised, need to draw on certain personal characteristics and, dare one 
say it, virtues. 
 
Thus in some respects, good quality vocational education is very well equipped to develop 
one of the prized goods of education, namely character.  This is a theme common in the 
literature of the German speaking countries: Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Keller’s Heinrich 
Lee are good examples of Bildungsroman characters who develop and discover themselves 
through sustained occupational engagement as novices struggling to achieve a sense of what 
is excellent in the occupation and how they measure up to those standards. This is  not to say 
that school-based education is incapable of providing such goods, but the artificial character 
of schools, lauded by, for example Oakeshott (see Fuller,1976), becomes an obstacle in some 
respects as the German vocational educator Kerschensteiner (1930) recognized.  If the 
development of character is taken to be a central aim of education (Erziehung rather than 
Bildung in the German tradition), then schools’ efforts to do so cannot be dismissed as 
‘schooling’ rather than ‘education’ unless one has already taken a firm position on the 
educative nature of some kinds of learning to the detriment of others. It is notable that in this 
respect Barrow follows the earlier Peters rather than the later, who became much more aware 
of the possibilities of varieties of education that engaged fully with the practical and even 
with the vocational spheres of life. 
 
Surely though, a conservative form of  liberal education, conceived of as cultural initiation 
cannot be managed through vocational education, however sophisticated? Vocational 
education is not preparation for child or adolescent labour; it concerns preparation for adult 
life, primarily but not exclusively in the medium of employment and must, therefore, make 
use of the resources of liberal education as a preliminary, building on and even extending the 
liberally educated capacities of the student by doing so. We have already noted the growing 
role of specialization within liberal education and the somewhat porous boundaries between 
an achieved education as a purely personal good, as a positional good and as an instrumental 
good in the labour market.  
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Just as in our society liberal education conceived of as cultural initiation has more than a 
purely personal aim, but fits individuals for employment and citizenship, so good quality 
vocational education has significant liberal and civic aspects. Vocational education which 
aims to prepare young people for technically complex work requiring high levels of 
independence and co-ordination cannot but rely on a firm liberal educational footing in which 
the traditional secondary school subjects figure very strongly. Decent levels of literacy and 
numeracy will be an absolute prerequisite and in many occupations a good scientific 
education will also be important. Many ‘high skill’ occupations depend on the application of 
systematic, often scientific, knowledge to practice, not just in the sense of maxims to be 
applied in the workplace, but as bodies of knowledge that can be interrogated as part of 
professional judgment. But, more than this, it is arguable that the acquisition of a broad 
‘cultural literacy’ (Hirsch 1987) is important to give an employee of whom independence and 
intelligence of action is expected, a broad conceptual and contextual understanding of the 
society in which he is living in order that he can make independent professional judgements 
for the firm he works for. Needless to say, an employee who is expected to obey orders and to 
carry out narrow routines will not need such attributes in order to carry out their job. For such 
employees, vocational training will be adequate. 
 
I mentioned earlier that although there can be variation in what kind of education is suitable 
for what kind of person, in societies that are relatively equal and cohesive, that variation can 
be rendered into conceptions which bear quite a close resemblance to each other. A 
particularly important issue is that of the extent to which liberal education should continue to 
be a  significant element of vocational education. I have already suggested that, in some 
respects, the Erziehung element in vocational education can relatively easily be realized, 
perhaps to a greater extent than in some forms of liberal education. But it can be argued that a 
continuing liberal element in vocational education also has an important liberal as well as 
vocational role. A good case has been made out that the traditional liberal curriculum 
embodies ‘powerful knowledge’ (see some of the contributions in Lauder et al 2012 and in 
particular the contribution by Muller). It is not just that the traditional liberal subjects 
continue to be very prestigious and confer an enhanced social status on those who have a 
good acquaintance with them, it is also that they are, arguably, necessary for one to have 
influence in one’s own society. Without good numeracy, literacy, a sure grasp of  history, 
geography and science, not to mention acquaintance with languages and the arts, it is difficult 
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to get a decent grip on the concerns of the dominant sections of society whose thought-world 
tends to be formed through an intensive version of precisely such an education. 
 
Such an education, extended into one’s late adolescence and early adulthood, allows one to 
develop the kind of informed desires (Winch 2005, Ch.7) that are an important component of 
the range of choices for  a worthwhile life that an educated person might reasonably be 
expected to make. This is true for the choices one might make for one’s occupation as well as 
for other aspects of one’s life.  It also helps to create a firm grounding for continuing personal 
education. In this respect a continuing subject-based and liberal strand within vocational 
education is a prerequisite of  the Humboldtian conception of allgemeine Menschenbildung  
or general human education, which provides for the condition of continuing development of 
individuality, while at the same time allowing an individual to play a part within established 
social roles (Benner, 2003). Last, but not least, it has an important civic function. In order to 
engage with political, social and economic élites on their own terms, a good acquaintance 
with the high culture that constitutes their principal medium of thought is important for the 
sustaining of an informed and active citizenry which aspires to engage with the direction of 
their own society. This point remains the case whatever explicit provision for civic education 
is made within vocational education programmes. 
 
It is sometimes argued that the presence of academic subjects in vocational education is not 
necessary for vocational purposes and that apprentices and students should rather be able to 
access the knowledge that they need in order to carry out specific vocational projects and 
tasks. Rather than being introduced to subjects, it is argued, students should be able to access 
Lernfelder or fields of learning which will enable them to glean the knowledge necessary to 
complete the work that they are undertaking. While Lernfelder may indeed be able to do this, 
it is difficult to maintain at the same time that they will continue to provide the powerful 
knowledge needed to provide access to civic activity and to their further personal 
development. It is true that the Lernfelder are concerned with the specifically technically 
knowledge required to practice within an occupation, rather than the broader knowledge 
associated with civic and personal development. However, the disciplines associated with 
technical competence, such as mechanics or economics, are also part of the extended liberal 
education of someone preparing for work, just as they are for the economics graduate wishing 
to go into banking or the engineering graduate wishing to become an engineer. It is desirable, 
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therefore, that subjects continue to be given an important role in the technical aspects of 
vocational education. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
It has been argued against those who argue against the ‘contestability’ of educational 
concepts that there is no one preferred form of education.  However, in developed Western 
societies with a broadly classless temper, the provision of different educational routes to 
individuals with different interests and aspirations need not involve the provision of routes 
that do not share significant similarities. Indeed, it is argued that the character developing 
aspects of European type apprenticeship is a very effective vehicle for achieving some 
important liberal aims, while the continuation of subject-based academic education is an 
crucial component of a vocational education worthy of the name. Barrow’s vision of liberal 
education not only survives the promotion of such diverse routes but positively requires a 
broad education up to and including lower secondary education. 
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